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     1. Introduction
Is dierential commodity taxation desirable in an economy where moral hazard is present?
Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) showed that in general the answer to this question is armative.
The rationale behind this result is simple: typically an insured individual exerts less eort,
to avoid a bad outcome, than what is socially desirable. Therefore, to provide the individual
with the incentives to take the appropriate level of care, it is optimal to subsidize those goods
which are complementary with the eort level and tax those goods which are substitutes for
it. Since taxes and subsidies introduce a wedge between prices and marginal costs, an
optimal policy minimizes the welfare costs stemming from the insucient level of care and
the distortions induced by taxes and subsidies.
The reasoning just outlined is based on the presumption that the benet from altering
the level of eort, by changing consumers' prices through commodity taxes, outweighs the
cost of tax distortions. Nevertheless, if preferences over consumption goods and the level of
eort are separable, and if the probability of random outcomes depends only on the latter,
one would expect that any level of eort induced by an optimal policy with taxes could
be implemented by lump-sum transfers which do not interfere with incentive compatibility.
Hence dierential commodity taxation would not be required.
In this paper we show that the above intuition is correct. More precisely, we follow Arnott
and Stiglitz (1986) and consider a government which seeks to insure individuals against
idiosyncratic shocks using income transfers. In addition, the government has the option to
levy commodity taxes. Under the assumption that commodities are separable from the level
of eort in the utility function, we prove that the solution set of the government's optimal
taxation problem does include a policy of taxes and transfers that involves no commodity
taxation at all (see Proposition 1 below). Also, we show that if taxes on consumption
goods are to be imposed, they do not alter relative prices (see Proposition 2 below). To the
best of our knowledge this result has not been derived before in the simple manner we put
forward here. Arnott and Stiglitz (1983, p.28) obtained an analogous result, but under more
restrictive assumptions. Indeed, they studied the optimal taxation problem by analyzing
quite cumbersome rst order conditions. In order to render them more manageable, they
assumed two consumption goods and additively-separable preferences over these goods. In
contrast, our proof dispenses with any characterization of the optimal taxation problem
through rst order conditions, and we do not assume that preferences over commodities are
additively-separable, nor do we restrict the number of consumption goods. Moreover, our
assumptions on the probability of random shocks and the cost-of-exerting-eort function are
very general.
Note that our Propositions 1 and 2 below may be viewed as a formalization of what
Mirrlees refers to as the no-tax principle, that is the idea that \When preferences within a
group of commodities are independent of the private variables, relative prices for that group
should not be distorted by taxation"(Mirrlees, 1995, p.389).
Our result is somewhat related to the literature on competitive equilibria in economies
with moral hazard. Indeed, Lisboa (2001) has shown that competitive equilibria are con-
strained ecient if insurance rms can strategically oer exclusive contracts, and if prefer-
ences over consumption and eort are separable. In this case taxation of consumption goods
1would not be required, a nding which is consistent with the result we will prove below1.
However, under more general assumptions, competitive equilibria are not constrained
ecient and dierential commodity taxation is thus welfare-improving. Indeed, this result
encompasses other type of informational asymmetries, as argued by Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1986)2.
Regarding the approach to proving our results, we should mention that it is close in spirit
to Laroque's (2005), even thought the type of informational asymmetries therein contem-
plated are dierent from the moral hazard problem we study here3. Moreover, in the proof
of Propositions 1 and 2 we draw on Lisboa's (2001, p.566) idea of exploiting the duality
between utility maximization and expenditure minimization.
The paper is organized as follows: in the second section we describe the economic en-
vironment and we formalize our assumptions. In the third section we examine individuals'
optimal choices of consumption bundles and eort level, and we set-up the government op-
timal taxation problem. The fourth section contains our main results on the structure of
optimal taxation.
2. The economy
There is a nite number of consumption goods, indexed by l = 1;:::;L, and a single non-
reproducible good, indexed by l = 0. There is a [0;1]-continuum of ex-ante identical indi-
viduals. Each individual is endowed with the non-reproducible good which is supplied as
a unique input to the production sector. The latter is characterized by a constant returns
to scale technology with xed coecients and no joint production. Individuals are subject
to an idiosyncratic random shock to their endowment of the non-reproducible good. For
simplicity, we assume that there are only two realizations of the shock, indexed by s = 1;2.
Individual trades in commodities are not observable, whereas the realization of the shocks
are observable. Thus the government insures individuals against uncertainty using lump-
sum transfers contingent upon idiosyncratic states. In addition, the government can impose
linear taxes or subsidies on consumption goods.
The generic consumer has preferences over all the existing goods represented by a contin-
uous utility function u : R
L+1
+ → R which is assumed to be strictly monotonic and strictly
quasi-concave. Moreover, it is assumed that indierence surfaces passing through strictly
positive bundles do not intersect the boundary of the consumption set. By virtue of this
assumption, it is further assumed that preferences satisfy the following smoothness property4
Assumption 1. h(p;  u) = h(p′;  u) implies p = p′ for  > 0
where h(p;  u) is the compensated demand at prices p and utility level  u.
1See, however, Panaccione (2007) for an analysis of the relevance of separability of preferences for the
constrained eciency of equilibria.
2We know from Prescott and Townsend (1984) that, when it is possible to restrict consumption patterns,
constrained ecient allocations with moral hazard can be decentralized as competitive equilibria. There
is no inconsistency with the result just mentioned, since that restriction is not assumed therein; see, for
instance, Arnott, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1994) and Stiglitz (1994, p.29).
3See also Kaplov (2006), Hellwig (2008) and Gauthier and Laroque (2009).
4Assumption 1 is akin to the directional density employed by Rader (1976).
2Agents optimally choose consumption bundles, supply of the production input, and a
level of eort a ∈ A, where A is a compact subset of R. By choosing a, the individual incurs
a cost (disutility) c(a), where c : A → R+ is assumed to be a continuous function. As usual,
the eort is not observable and aects the probability of the realizations of the idiosyncratic
shock. Therefore, in what follows s(a) denotes the probability of state s if eort level a
is chosen, where s : A → (0;1) is assumed to be a continuous function. Preferences over
commodities and eort are separable. Thus, the utility of a generic bundle (x;a) ∈ R
L+1
+ ×A
is given by u(x) − c(a).
Normalized producer prices are (q;1) ∈ R
L+1
++ , where q is the price vector of consumption
goods and the second component is the normalized price of the non-reproducible input. Note
that q ∈ RL
++ is xed by virtue of the assumptions on technology5. Consumers are subject
to linear taxation levied on consumption goods. Hence consumer prices are equal to q +  ,
for some  ∈ RL. In addition to commodity taxation, the government sets state-contingent
lump-sum transfers Ts ∈ R. In what follows, we will refer to the tuple (;T) = (;T1;T2) ∈
RL+2 as a policy. The objective of the government is to choose a feasible policy so as to
maximize individuals' ex-ante utility6. The government takes into account agents' optimal
choices of commodities and eort. In other words, the government maximizes the ex-ante
indirect utility of the representative agent.
3. Optimal choices
For any s = 1;2, let us denote by xs = (xls;x0s) ∈ R
L+1
+ the generic commodity bundle. The
generic agent chooses, ex-ante and simultaneously, the level of eort and the commodity
bundles contingent on the realization of idiosyncratic shocks so as to maximize expected
utility. When the idiosyncratic state unfolds, the generic individual implements planned
purchases of commodities on spot markets. Because preferences are separable, it is easy to
see that the optimal choice problem can be decomposed as follows: given a policy (;T),
each individual chooses a commodity bundle
xs(q;;Ts) = argmax{u(xs) : (q + ) · xls + x0s ≤  x0s − Ts} ; (1)
where  x0s is the endowment of the non-reproducible good in state s. Since the budget
constraint correspondence is continuous and compact-valued, xs : RL
++ × RL+1 → R
L+1
++ is a
continuous function. Given the optimal commodity bundle xs = xs(q;;Ts), each individual





s(a)u(xs) − c(a) : a ∈ A
}
: (2)
Clearly, by the Maximum Theorem  : RL
++ × RL+2  A is an upper hemi-continuous




s(a)u(xs) − c(a) with xs = xs(q;;Ts) and a ∈ (q;;T); (3)
5See, e.g., Gale (1955) and Arrow and Hahn (1971, section 2.11).
6A policy is said to feasible if it does not result in a budget decit.
3which is a continuous function. The government anticipates individuals' optimal choices,
given a policy (;T), and thus solves the following problem:
max









s(a)Ts ≥ 0 for any a ∈ (q;;T):
Note that the inequality constraint in the above problem asserts that the government
must not run a budget decit.
4. Optimal taxation
Let (q) denote the set of optimal policies and assume that (q) ̸= ∅. The rst result we
prove is that consumption good taxation is superuous.
Proposition 1. There exists (^ ; ^ T) ∈ (q) such that ^  = 0.
Proof. The proof is by construction. Pick any (∗;T ∗) ∈ (q). Construct the policy (^ ; ^ T)
as follows:




s ≡ u(xs(q;∗;T ∗
s )) and e(q;u∗
s) is the expenditure function at prices (q;1) and utility
level u∗
s. From the identity u(x(p;e(p;u))) ≡ u it is easy to see that
u(xs(q; ^ ; ^ Ts)) = u
∗
s ;
and therefore, by (2), we get




s) ≤ q ·xls(q;∗;T ∗
s )+x0s(q;∗;T ∗
s ). Using the budget constraint in (1),
we obtain
 x0s − q · xls(q;
∗;T
∗
s ) − x0s(q;
∗;T
∗








^ Ts =  x0s − e(q;u
∗
s) ≥  x0s − q · xls(q;
∗;T
∗
s ) − x0s(q;
∗;T
∗




s ) + T
∗
s : (5)



















s ≥ 0: (6)
By (3), v(q; ^ ; ^ T) = v(q;∗;T ∗), and therefore it follows immediately that (^ ; ^ T) ∈ (q).
Proposition 1 above is a general result which does not require assumption 1. We now add
assumption 1 and we argue that even if an optimal policy involving taxes and/or subsidies
exists, then (i) subsidies are bounded from below; (ii) relative prices of consumption goods
are not distorted. That is, there is no dierential commodity taxation. Thus, Proposition 2
below comforms to the no-tax principle mentioned in the introduction.
4Proposition 2. Under assumption 1, if (∗;T ∗) ∈ (q) then there exists a  > −1 such
that ∗ = q.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that for any  > −1, ∗ ̸= q. That is, q + ∗ ̸=
(1 + )q. By assumption 1,
hs(q;u
∗





s ≡ u(xs(q;∗;T ∗
s )). Hence, by strict quasi-concavity of u we must have
e(q;u
∗
s) < (q;1) · hs(q + 
∗;u
∗
s) = q · xls(q;
∗;T
∗




As in the proof of Proposition 1, it follows from (4), (5) and (6) that
∑
s
s(a)^ Ts > 0 (7)
for any a ∈ (q; ^ ; ^ T). Now dene the correspondence
∑





s(a)Ts : a ∈ (q;;T)
}
:
Because s : A → (0;1) is continuous and  : RL
++×RL+2  A is an upper hemi-continuous
and compact-valued correspondence,
∑
s (s ◦ )Ts is upper hemi-continuous7. Also, note
that (7) above implies
∑
s
s((q; ^ ; ^ T))^ Ts ⊆ (0;+∞).
Therefore, by upper hemi-continuity one can nd a positive " and construct the policy (








s s((q; ^ ; ^ T "))^ T "






for all a ∈ (q; ^ ; ^ T "). In other words, the policy
(
0; ^ T1 − "; ^ T2 − "
)
is feasible. Clearly, (1)
implies that u(xs(q; ^ ; ^ T "
s)) > u(xs(q; ^ ; ^ Ts)). Thus, for all a ∈ (q; ^ ; ^ T), we have that




s(a)u(xs(q; ^ ; ^ T
"
s)) − c(a) >
∑
s
s(a)u(xs(q; ^ ; ^ Ts)) − c(a) = v(q; ^ ; ^ T):
7See Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 17.32).
5Since v(q; ^ ; ^ T) = v(q;∗;T ∗), we get




which contradicts the hypothesis that (∗;T ∗) ∈ (q).
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